Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78369
Authors: 
Riechmann, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät, Universität Hannover 261
Abstract: 
Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walras equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the long run outcome. Apart from the fact that there is a difference between social and individual learning, the key parameter is shown to be the degree of rationality of the learning agents: Learning the Cournot strategy requires the agents to acquire a large amount of information and to use sophisticated computational techniques, while the Walras strategy can be shown to be a particular 'low rationality result'.
Subjects: 
Agent Based Economics
Oligopoly Games
Learning
Rationality
Spite Effect
Evolutionary Algorithms
JEL: 
C63
D43
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
169.93 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.