Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78223
Authors: 
Normann, Hans-Theo
Requate, Till
Waichman, Israel
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 100
Abstract: 
One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric Cournot duopoly, we conduct internet treatments lasting more than a month. Subjects make the same number of decisions as in the short-term counterparts, but they decide once a day. We compare these treatments to corresponding standard laboratory treatments and also to short-term internet treatments lasting one hour. We do not observe differences in behavior between the short- and long-term in the symmetric treatments, and only a small difference in the asymmetric treatments. We overall conclude that behavior is not considerably different between the short- and long-term.
Subjects: 
internet experiment
Cournot oligopoly
long-term interactions
methodology
internet vs. laboratory experiment
JEL: 
L13
C93
C72
D43
D21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-099-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.