Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78223
Autoren: 
Normann, Hans-Theo
Requate, Till
Waichman, Israel
Datum: 
2013
Reihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 100
Zusammenfassung: 
One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric Cournot duopoly, we conduct internet treatments lasting more than a month. Subjects make the same number of decisions as in the short-term counterparts, but they decide once a day. We compare these treatments to corresponding standard laboratory treatments and also to short-term internet treatments lasting one hour. We do not observe differences in behavior between the short- and long-term in the symmetric treatments, and only a small difference in the asymmetric treatments. We overall conclude that behavior is not considerably different between the short- and long-term.
Schlagwörter: 
internet experiment
Cournot oligopoly
long-term interactions
methodology
internet vs. laboratory experiment
JEL: 
L13
C93
C72
D43
D21
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-099-4
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.66 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.