Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77915
Authors: 
Baskaran, Thushyanthan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research 165
Abstract: 
The theoretical literature on common pool problems in fiscal policy suggests that government fragmentation increases public expenditures. In parliamentary regimes, the fragmentation hypothesis refers to (i) coalition governments and (ii) cabinet size. This paper explores the effect of coalition governments and cabinet size on public expenditures with panel data covering all 16 German States over the period 1975-2010. Identification is facilitated by the large within-variation in the incidence of coalition governments and the size of the cabinet in the German States. In addition, I exploit a feature of state electoral laws to construct a credible instrument for the likelihood of coalition governments.
Subjects: 
government fragmentation
common pool problems
coalition government
cabinet size
public expenditures
JEL: 
D78
H61
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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