Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77471
Authors: 
Bignon, Vincent
Flandreau, Marc
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper 09/2012
Abstract: 
This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant data on influence and exploitation of newspaper has been hiding in plain sight in stock exchange or over-the-counter prices, since stock transactions reflect the value of this capture. Empirical data is consistent with increasing levels of looting in France during the 1930s. We provide a comparison with Britain and argue that Britain managed to protect its newspapers better.
Subjects: 
media
governance
minority shareholders
control premium
corruption
interwar
France
JEL: 
D72
G34
L82
N24
N74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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