Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76897
Autoren: 
Schmidt, Reinhard H.
Spindler, Gerald
Datum: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting No. 27
Zusammenfassung: 
In a series of recent papers, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have developed further the concept of path dependence, combined it with concepts of evolution and used it to challenge the wide-spread view that the corporate governance systems of the major advanced economies are likely to converge towards the economically best system at a rapid pace. The present paper shares this skepticism, but adds several aspects which strengthen the point made by Roe and Bebchuk. The present paper argues that it is important for the topic under discussion to distinguish clearly between two arguments which can explain path dependence. One of them is based on the role of adjustment costs, and the other one uses concepts borrowed from evolutionary biology. Making this distinction is important because the two concepts of path dependence have different implications for the issue of rapid convergence to the best system. In addition, we introduce a formal concept of complementarity and demonstrate that national corporate governance systems are usefully regarded as – possibly consistent – systems of complementary elements. Complementarity is a reason for path dependence which supports the socio-biological argument. The dynamic properties of systems composed of complementary elements are such that a rapid convergence towards a universally best corporate governance systems is not likely to happen. We then proceed by showing for the case of corporate governance systems shaped by complementarity, that there even is the possibility of a convergence towards a common system which is economically inferior. And in the specific case of European integration, inefficient convergence of corporate governance systems is a possible future course of events.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate governance
complementarity
convergence
economic systems
JEL: 
G38
K22
P50
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
95.22 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.