Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76236
Authors: 
Polk, Andreas
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich 0205
Abstract: 
This paper investigates if multinationals in.uence the political process through lobbying more effectively than national firms. First, I introduce a model which contrasts a multinational's incentives for lobbying with those of a national firm. Then the effect of lobbying on the political decision is analyzed. I conclude that multinationals have smaller incentives to lobby because they have smaller stakes in national markets. But the effectiveness of lobbying by multinationals might be higher if the government cares much about production in the home country. The resulting regulation depends on the relative strength of these effects.
Subjects: 
multinational enterprizes
regulation
policy formation
lobbying
interest groups
foreign direct investment
JEL: 
D72
F23
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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