Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/75767 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 400
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We consider the political economy of a monetary union wheremember governments attempt to influence the policy of the commoncentral bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentivecontracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank,the equilibrium implements a weighted average of the countries‘most preferred policy. We then argue that making the bank inflationaverse and/or attentive towards the countries‘ economicdevelopments is undesirable in this context.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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