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Mohr, Ernst
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge, Serie A: Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik, Universität Konstanz 202
The implicit assumption made when deterrence solutions to repeated games are constructed, is that perfectness is a sufficient condition for the credibility of threats. In this paper it is shown that the validity of this assumption hinges on another assumption which proves to be unsatisfactory - namely that players exhibit a different rationality at different stages of the game. A consequence of making rationality independent of time is that sufficient conditions for the credibility of threats fail to exist.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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