Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74136 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 45.2005
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties.
Schlagwörter: 
International environmental agreements
Timing of participation decision
Coalition theory
Role of international regulator
JEL: 
C72
D70
H41
Q50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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