Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74000
Authors: 
Rusinowska, Agnieszka
Berghammer, Rudolf
de Swart, Harrie
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 77.2006
Abstract: 
A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different fields, such as relational algebra, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. So, we can choose an un-dominated government. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply social choice rules. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.
Subjects: 
Graph Theory
RELVIEW
Relational Algebra
Dominance
Stable Government
JEL: 
D85
C63
C88
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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