Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73972
Authors: 
Echenique, Federico
Yenmez, Mehmet B.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 120.2005
Abstract: 
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.
Subjects: 
Matching markets
Core
Lattice
Gale-Shapley algorithm
JEL: 
C65
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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