Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73921
Authors: 
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
Acocella, Nicola
Pauwels, Wilfried
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 154.2004
Abstract: 
This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we also discuss in an informal way possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.
Subjects: 
Social pacts
Axiomatic bargaining
Unions
Issue linkage
JEL: 
E00
E58
E61
J50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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