Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73905 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 31.2006
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
We present a simple procedure that selects the strategies most likely to be played by inexperienced agents who interact in one shot 2x2 matching pennies games. As a first step we axiomatically describe playersÂ’ beliefs. We find the minimax regret criterion to be the simplest functional form that satisfies all the axioms. Then we hypothesize players act as if they were best responding to the belief their opponent plays accordino to minimax regret. When compared with existing experimental evidences about one shot matching pennies games, the procedure correctly indicates the choices of around 80% of the players. Applications to other classes of games are also explored.
Subjects: 
Predictions
Minimax regret
Beliefs
Matching pennies
Experiments
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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