Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73876
Authors: 
Erharter, Dominik
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2012-11
Abstract: 
We study credence goods markets where an expert not only cares for her own monetary payoff, but also for the monetary payoff of her customer. We show how an expert with heterogeneous distributional preferences responds to monetary incentives in the absence of institutions, under liability and/or verifiability and identify optimal contracts for an expert with distributional preferences in each of these settings.
Subjects: 
other-regarding preferences
credence good
institution
contract theory
industrial organization
JEL: 
D63
D64
L13
L15
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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