Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73478
Authors: 
Raschky, Paul A.
Schwarze, Reimund
Schwindt, Manijeh
Zahn, Ferdinand
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2010-03
Abstract: 
This paper discusses the problem of crowding out of insurance by co-existing governmental relief programs - so-called 'charity hazard' - in a context of different institutional schemes of governmental relief in Austria and Germany. We test empirically whether an assured partial relief scheme (as in Austria) drives a stronger crowding out of private insurance than a scheme promising full relief which is subject to ad hoc political decision making (as in Germany). Our general finding is that the institutional design of governmental relief programs significantly affects the demand for private natural hazard insurance.
Subjects: 
Insurance demand
governmental relief
natural hazards
JEL: 
D78
D81
G22
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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