Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73287
Authors: 
Dulleck, Uwe
Frijters, Paul
Podczeck, Konrad
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz 0613
Abstract: 
We study all-pay auctions with budget-constrained bidders who have access to fair insurance before bidding simultaneously over a prize. We characterize a unique equilibrium for the special cases of two bidders and one prize, show existence and a heuristic for finding an equilibrium in the case of multiple bidders and multiple prizes. We end with an example of non-uniqueness of equilibria for the general case of multiple prizes and multiple players.
Subjects: 
all-pay auctions
fair lotteries
political campaigning
oligopoly
regional competition
patent races
JEL: 
C72
D72
D42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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