Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72260
Authors: 
Glycopantis, Dionysius
Muir, Allan
Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 148
Abstract: 
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided.
Subjects: 
differential information economy
rational expectations equilibrium
coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility
implementation
game trees
private core
weak fine core
interim weak fine core
JEL: 
C71
C72
D5
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
927.28 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.