Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72043 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 440
Verlag: 
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, Baltimore, MD
Zusammenfassung: 
Banning affirmative action from college admissions decisions cannot prevent an admissions office that cares about diversity from achieving it through channels other than the explicit consideration of race We construct a model of college admissions where candidates from two groups with different average qualifications compete for a fixed number of seats When an admissions office that cares both about the quality and diversity of its entering class can use group identity as a criterion for admissions its preferred admissions rule selects the best-qualified candidates from each group When it cannot use affirmative action the admissions office's preferred rule generally does not select the best-qualified candidates from either group: it randomizes over candidates to achieve diversity at the expense of within-group selection A ban always reduces diversity and may also lower average quality Moreover even when a total ban on affirmative action raises average quality a partial ban may raise average quality even more
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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