Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72043
Authors: 
Chan, Jimmy
Eyster, Erik
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 440
Abstract: 
Banning affirmative action from college admissions decisions cannot prevent an admissions office that cares about diversity from achieving it through channels other than the explicit consideration of race We construct a model of college admissions where candidates from two groups with different average qualifications compete for a fixed number of seats When an admissions office that cares both about the quality and diversity of its entering class can use group identity as a criterion for admissions its preferred admissions rule selects the best-qualified candidates from each group When it cannot use affirmative action the admissions office's preferred rule generally does not select the best-qualified candidates from either group: it randomizes over candidates to achieve diversity at the expense of within-group selection A ban always reduces diversity and may also lower average quality Moreover even when a total ban on affirmative action raises average quality a partial ban may raise average quality even more
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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