Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71949
Authors: 
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 2007-26
Abstract: 
Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this paper I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions.
Subjects: 
deception
expectations
team decision making
individual decision making
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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