Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71221
Authors: 
Ritzberger, Klaus
Shorish, Jamsheed
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) 113
Abstract: 
This paper demonstrates that the current literature on cross-ownership among firms underestimates the true degree of separation between cash flow rights and voting rights. We use accounting identities to define coefficients of control, such that any (direct or indirect) control of a firm may be identified using these coefficients. This procedure is sufficient to show that under cross-ownership the voting rights associated with ownership are typically underestimated. We demonstrate by example that control and ownership of dividend rights may be entirely separated, and that multiple equilibria may exist in economies with cross ownership.
Subjects: 
cross-ownership
ownership and control
corporate governance
JEL: 
G32
G34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
181.59 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.