Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70173 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2012,040
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
Approximate truth refers to the principle that border cases should be analyzed by solving generic cases and solving border cases as limits of generic ones (Brennan et al., 2008). Our study experimentally explores whether this conceptual principle is also behaviorally appealing. To do so, we focus on perfectness (Selten, 1975) and use his example game with (no) multiplicity of (perfect) equilibria. Distinguishing three uniform perturbation levels, we check for monotonicity (all players react monotonically to the perturbation level) and then explore the behavioral relevance of approximate truth.
Subjects: 
experimental games
trembling hand perfectness
perturbed strategies
JEL: 
C70
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
354.94 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.