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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 11-16 [rev.]
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that portfolio constraints have important implications for management compensation and performance evaluation. In particular, in the presence of portfolio constraints, allowing for benchmarking can be bene…cial. Benchmark design arises as an alternative effort inducement mechanism vis-a-vis relaxing portfolio constraints. Numerically, we solve jointly for the manager's linear incentive fee and the optimal benchmark. The size of the incentive fee and the risk adjustment in the benchmark composition are increasing in the investor's risk tolerance and the manager's ability to acquire and process private information.
Schlagwörter: 
market timing
incentive fee
benchmarking
portfolio constraints
JEL: 
D81
D82
J33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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