Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69488
Authors: 
Bigoni, Maria
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 7051
Abstract: 
We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available.
Subjects: 
non-standard subject pools
prisoner's dilemma
peer punishment
artefactual field experiment
stranger matching
JEL: 
C90
C70
D80
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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