Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/68915 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1996
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie I No. 284
Verlag: 
Universität Konstanz, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Statistik, Konstanz
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper proves that the Bayesian approach to learning and expectations formation implies no propositions that could conceivably be refuted by observation. For a (non-expanding) universe infinite in time but finite at any point of time, it is shown that by a suitable choice of priors, any betting strategy can be rationalized. Consequently, no sequence of future choices can be excluded on the basis of a decision maker's v. Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, her knowledge of past observations, and the assumption of Bayesian rationality. Since no betting strategy is irrational, Bayesianism is useless as a normative theory as well.
Schlagwörter: 
Bayesianism
Bayesian learning
decision theory
expectations
learning
rational expectations
rationality
rationalizability
subjectively expected utility theory
subjective probability
JEL: 
B41
C11
D81
D83
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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