Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68256
Authors: 
Dechenaux, Emmanuel
Kovenock, Dan
Sheremeta, Roman M.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2012-109
Abstract: 
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rankorder tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the contest success function, number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review research on sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, and contests between groups, as well as real-effort and field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests to the study of legal systems, political competition, war, conflict avoidance, sales, and charities, and suggest directions for future research.
Subjects: 
contests
all-pay auctions
tournaments
experiments
JEL: 
C7
C9
D7
H4
J4
J7
K4
L2
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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