Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/65729 
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dc.contributor.authorVida, Péteren
dc.contributor.authorAzacis, Helmutsen
dc.date.accessioned2012-05-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-02T14:26:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-02T14:26:38Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/65729-
dc.description.abstractWe present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCardiff University, Cardiff Business School |cCardiffen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCardiff Economics Working Papers |xE2012/10en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated equilibriumen
dc.subject.keyworddetail-free mechanismen
dc.subject.keywordmediated pre-play communicationen
dc.titleA detail-free mediator-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn715522051en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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