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dc.contributor.authorVida, Péteren_US
dc.contributor.authorAzacis, Helmutsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.en_US
dc.publisher|aCardiff University, Cardiff Business School |cCardiffen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCardiff Economics Working Papers |xE2012/10en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keyworddetail-free mechanismen_US
dc.subject.keywordmediated pre-play communicationen_US
dc.titleA detail-free mediatoren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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