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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2002,09
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Based on a combined register database for Norwegian and Swedish unemployment spells, we use the ‘between-countries-variation’ in the unemployment insurance systems to identify causal effects. The elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to the benefit replacement ratio is around -1.0 in Norway and -0.5 in Sweden. The limited benefit duration period in Sweden has a large positive impact on the hazard rate, despite generous renewal options through participation in labour market programs. Compulsory program participation seems to operate as a ‘stick’, rather than a ‘carrot’, and is therefore an efficienttool for counteracting moral hazard problems in the benefit system.
Schlagwörter: 
Unemployment spells
unemployment compensation
non-parametric duration analysis
JEL: 
C41
J64
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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