Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62970 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2007,02
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper has a dual purpose. First, I present a new modeling of partial naivete, and apply this to the analysis of procrastination. The decision maker is assumed to have stationary behavior and to be partially naive in the sense of perceiving that his current preferences may persist in the future. The behavioral implications of such partial naivete differ from those of related literature. Second, I suggest a general principle for welfare analysis in multi-self settings through a new application of Pareto-dominance, which is motivated by the existence of time-inconsistency and coincides with dominance relations used elsewhere in game theory. In the case of procrastination, it leads to a clear welfare conclusion: Being partially naive reduces welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
Procrastination
partial naivete
time-inconsistency
game theory
behavioral welfare economics
JEL: 
C70
D11
D60
D74
D91
E21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
291.95 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.