Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62487
Authors: 
Madies, Thierry
Villeval, Marie Claire
Wasmer, Malgorzata
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 6642
Abstract: 
We study the attitudes of junior and senior employees towards strategic uncertainty and competition, by means of a market entry game inspired by Camerer and Lovallo (1999). Seniors exhibit higher entry rates compared to juniors, especially when earnings depend on relative performance. This difference persists after controlling for attitudes towards non-strategic uncertainty and for beliefs on others' competitiveness and ability. Social image matters, as evidenced by the fact that seniors enter more when they predict others enter more and when they are matched with a majority of juniors. This contradicts the stereotype of risk averse and less competitive older employees.
Subjects: 
aging
risk
ambiguity
competitiveness
self-image
confidence
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D83
J14
J24
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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