Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62414 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 6629
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner in standardized school tests reduces the proportion of correct answers in monitored classes by 5.5 to 8.5% - depending on the grade and the test - with respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. We find that the effect of external monitoring in a class spills over to other classes in the same school. We argue that the negative effect of external supervision is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to distraction from having a stranger in the class.
Schlagwörter: 
education
testing
external monitoring
JEL: 
C31
H52
I2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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