Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61265
Authors: 
Oechssler, Jörg
Riedel, Frank
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1998,68
Abstract: 
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.
Subjects: 
replicator dynamics
evolutionary stability
continuous strategy spaces
oligopoly
JEL: 
C70
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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