Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60827
Title: 
Authors: 
Martin, Antoine
Skeie, David
von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 444
Abstract: 
This paper develops a model of financial institutions that borrow short-term and invest in long-term marketable assets. Because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation, they are subject to runs. We endogenize the profits of an intermediary and derive distinct liquidity and solvency conditions that determine whether a run can be prevented. We first characterize these conditions for an isolated intermediary and then generalize them to the case in which the intermediary can sell assets to prevent runs. The sale of assets can eliminate runs if the intermediary is solvent but illiquid. However, because of cash-in-the-market pricing, this becomes less likely as more intermediaries face problems. In the limit, in case of a general market run, no intermediary can sell assets to forestall a run, and our original solvency and liquidity constraints are again relevant for the stability of financial institutions.
Subjects: 
Investment banking
securities dealers
repurchase agreements
tri-party repo
runs
financial fragility
JEL: 
E44
E58
G24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
209.78 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.