Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/60193
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dc.contributor.authorJano, Dorianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-26T09:38:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-26T09:38:59Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60193-
dc.description.abstractThis article replicates and extends the Hille and Knill (2006) study on the implementation of the acquis communautaire in EU candidate countries. We use a different methodological approach, i.e. the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), and extend the analysis by incorporating EU-level factors (the intensity of EU conditionality). The fsQCA analysis shows that the bureaucratic effectiveness is systematically related to candidate countries' alignment performance whereas there is no systematic relationship between alignment performance, political constraints, financial capacities, government membership support and/or the absence of intensity of EU conditionality.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEuropa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration |cHamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration |x2/12en_US
dc.subject.ddc320en_US
dc.subject.keywordacquis communautaireen_US
dc.subject.keywordEU candidate countriesen_US
dc.subject.keywordCentral and Eastern Europeen_US
dc.subject.keywordenlargementen_US
dc.subject.keywordEuropeanizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfuzzy set qualitative comparative analysisen_US
dc.subject.keywordimplementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy changeen_US
dc.titleImplementation of the acquis communautaire in EU candidate countries: A reappraisalen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn719280087en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ekhdps:212-

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