Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59668
Authors: 
Kalai, Adam
Kalai, Ehud
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1512
Abstract: 
Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient outcome among the many individually rational possibilities in a strategic game, and (2) establishing a play protocol under which strategic players may achieve this outcome. The paper presents a general solution for two-person Bayesian games with monetary payoffs, under a strong revealed-payoff assumption. The proposed solution builds upon earlier concepts in game theory. It coincides with the von Neumann minmax value on the class of zero sum games and with the major solution concepts to the Nash Bargaining Problem. Moreover, the solution is based on a simple decomposition of every game into cooperative and competitive components, which is easy to compute.
Subjects: 
cooperative game theory
non- cooperative game theory
bargaining
min-max value
JEL: 
C70
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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