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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Galperti, Simone | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-22 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-07-12T12:33:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-07-12T12:33:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59656 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal, Myerson's Inscrutability Principle fails when there are many informed principals. I also find that, in contrast with common agency models with uninformed principals, the Delegation Principle (Menu Theorem) fails when principals are informed. I then focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which principals offer their mechanisms without randomizing. I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games with delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus and send cheap-talk signals. Next, I characterize the outcomes of arbitrary games without delegation as outcomes of a new game in which principals offer menus of direct revelation mechanisms, to which they truthfully report their types. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, IL | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDiscussion Paper |x1541 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D83 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D86 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | common agency | en |
dc.subject.keyword | informed principals | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Inscrutability Principle | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Delegation Principle | en |
dc.subject.keyword | menus | en |
dc.subject.keyword | signals | en |
dc.subject.keyword | direct revelation mechanisms | en |
dc.title | Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 672632160 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1541 | en |
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