Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59632
Authors: 
Condorelli, Daniele
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1482
Abstract: 
I study the welfare optimal allocation of a number of identical and indivisible objects to a set of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents under the hypothesis that money is not available. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum time that they are willing to wait in line to obtain a good. A priority list, which ranks agents according to their expected values, is optimal when hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing. Queues, which allocates the object to those who wait in line the longest, are optimal in a symmetric setting with decreasing hazard rates.
Subjects: 
rationing
queues
priority lists
lotteries
JEL: 
D45
D82
H42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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