Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58405 
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dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-07-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-12T13:34:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-12T13:34:14Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/58405-
dc.description.abstractHow can a rational player strategically control a myopic best reply player in a repeated two-player game? We show that in games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent, in time periods, and in the discount rate. As an interesting example outside this class of games we present a repeated textbook-like Cournot duopoly with non-negative prices and show that the optimal control strategy involves a cycle.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Department of Economics |cDavis, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x11-5en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordstrategic teachingen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.keywordadaptive heuristicsen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic optimizationen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic substitutesen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic complementsen
dc.subject.keywordmyopic playersen
dc.titleStrategic control of myopic best reply in repeated games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn717281639en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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