Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58405 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 11-5
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
How can a rational player strategically control a myopic best reply player in a repeated two-player game? We show that in games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent, in time periods, and in the discount rate. As an interesting example outside this class of games we present a repeated textbook-like Cournot duopoly with non-negative prices and show that the optimal control strategy involves a cycle.
Schlagwörter: 
strategic teaching
learning
adaptive heuristics
dynamic optimization
strategic substitutes
strategic complements
myopic players
JEL: 
C70
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
762.8 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.