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Working Paper No. 09-14
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
In [G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a semantics for one-stage AGM belief revision was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature. In this paper we extend the semantics of choice frames to deal with iterated belief revision and use the corresponding structures to analyze extensive-form games. Choice frames can be used to represent a player's initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs when informed that it is her turn to move. If the frame satisfies AGM-consistency and a natural postulate for iterated belief revision, then it is rationalizable by a total pre-order on the set of histories. We show that three properties of this total pre-order, together with the hypothesis of agreement among players, provide a characterization of the notion of consistent assessment, which is the central component of the notion of sequential equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson [Econometrica, 1982].
choice function
AGM belief revision
extensive-form game
sequential equilibrium
iterated belief revision
backward induction
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Working Paper

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