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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Dur, Robert | en |
dc.contributor.author | Tichem, Jan | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-31 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-06-08T13:57:28Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-06-08T13:57:28Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58345 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3826 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D23 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M55 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | altruism | en |
dc.subject.keyword | spite | en |
dc.subject.keyword | social relations | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | relational contracts | en |
dc.subject.keyword | efficiency wages | en |
dc.subject.keyword | subjective performance evaluation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Nash bargaining | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsbeziehungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Soziale Beziehungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungsanreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Unvollständiger Vertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Dynamisches Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Social relations and relational incentives | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 716601540 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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