Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57346
Authors: 
Betzer, André
Gider, Jasmin
Metzger, Daniel
Theissen, Erik
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CFS Working Paper 2011/04
Abstract: 
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Subjects: 
Insider Trading
Directors' Dealings
Corporate Governance
Market Efficiency
JEL: 
G14
G30
G32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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