Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56237 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 723
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
In the present work, I adopt the cognitive hierarchy approach to analyze the centipede game. To this end, I present and study an extensive-form version of Camerer et al.'s (2004) original normal-form model. The resulting predictions are evaluated empirically using laboratory data borrowed from a previously published experiment. The paper features two main contributions. First, it presents a parsimonious model that can, in principle, be generalized to any two-person extensive-form game of perfect information. Secondly, it demonstrates that in the centipede game the cognitive hierarchy approach leads to predictions which are not fully backwardly inductive and that can help to explain some key feature of the experimental data.
Schlagwörter: 
centipede game
cognitive hierarchy
paradox backward induction
experimental data analysis
JEL: 
C72
C92
D03
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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