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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Rotemberg, Julio J. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-07-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-23T08:23:41Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-02-23T08:23:41Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MA | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Papers |x06-12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | A13 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.title | Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 514906103 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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