Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55021
Authors: 
Engelen, Christian
Graf Lambsdorff, Johann
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-40-05
Abstract: 
The latest Argentinean debt restructuring was the first time the resolution of a modem financial crisis was completely handed over to the private financial markets without official intervention by public institutions. We argue that the resulting harshest haircut for private creditors in history can be related to a stag-hunt game played by creditors. We show that incentive schemes provided by the Argentinean government were factors facilitating this haircut. The analysis suggests that, contrary to the recognition in the literature, the effects of Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents within a restructuring process are not equal. In the case of Argentina the inclusion of Collective Action Clauses in the defaulted bonds could have benefited the holdout creditors.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
224.98 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.