Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425
Authors: 
Ilkiliç, Rahmi
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 32.2009
Abstract: 
Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.
Subjects: 
Cournot Markets
Networks
Nash Equilibrium
Centrality Measures
JEL: 
C62
C72
D85
L11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
335.79 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.