Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53302
Authors: 
Nieva, Ricardo
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 61.2008
Abstract: 
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.
Subjects: 
Efficiency
Bargaining Protocol
Counterproposals
Network Formation
Transfers
Externalities
Groups
Coalitions
JEL: 
C71
C72
C73
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
269.33 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.