Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53237
Authors: 
Mondello, Gérard
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 21.2011
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: the strict liability regime and the capped strict liability scheme. First, it shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the ceiling of responsibilities while victims wish to extend the amount of redress under a standard strict liability. Economic criteria for enforcing a regime rather than another one are lacking. Second, the paper shows that implementing civil strict liability rules may be done by setting up care standards as for instance in the nuclear or the maritime sectors and demanding to the injurers to comply with them. We show that this goal can be achieved by resorting to some friendly monitoring corresponding to frequent random controls with low fines rather than few controls that should involve heavy fines.
Subjects: 
Environment
Strict Liability
Ex-Ante Regulation
Ex-Post Liability
Judgment-Proof
Environment Law
CERCLA
Environmental Liability
JEL: 
K0
K32
Q01
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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