Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53209 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 41.2009
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they fall back on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions-particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness - and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them.
Schlagwörter: 
Coalition
Fallback Process
Kingmaker Leader
Cardinally Single-peaked
Ordinally Single-peaked
JEL: 
C71
C78
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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